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GEOGRAPHICAL DEREGULATION
'
MARKET STRUCTURE
AND MORTGAGE RATES: A NOTE
Bill B. Francis
lftekhar Hasan
INTROD UCTION

Depository institutions and other financial service firms have experienced
dramatic changes in product market competition over the past decade.
Relaxation of interstate and intrastate branching restrictions in most states
has enabled the largest banking organizations to participate in an increasing
number of geogr aphic markets. Currently, a strong trend toward a
comprehensive nationwide banking system seems to exist. This development
has led to an active debate in both state and federal legislation as well as in
the banking literature regarding the benefits of geographical deregulations.
The purpose of this paper is to provide empirical evidence that will help in
resolving the debate as to the benefits of geographical deregulation, i.e.,
interstate banking.
Opponents of interstate banking initiatives argue that a branching
network of mostly large institutions would lead to excessive concentration and,
eventually, to a monopolistic banking market. In contrast, supporters of
nationwide banking legislation claim that de regulation would produce a
competitive banking market that would force depository institutions to become
more efficient. Additionally. they believe that competition would bring
significant benefits to ban.king consumers. Thus, it is raising an empirical issue
as to whether interstate ban.king would benefit or harm banking consumers.
Using both market and firm level cross-sectional data-of states that have
experienced similar interstate banking laws-the authors evaluate the
impact of geographical der egulation on the variability of mortgage rates
across depository markets and firms. pecifically, at the market level, the
author s investigate the impact of deregulation on the variability of effective
interest rates on conventional mortgage loans closed by all major types of
mortgage lenders; at the firm level. the author s evaluate the variability of
yield in mortgages among thrift institutions in the same market.
The results indicate that the level of interstate ban.king activity in local
metropolitan statistical markets (MSAsl has an inverse effect on the mortgage
rates. This effect is evidenced in both market and fi rm level regressions. This
fi nding is consistent with the hypothesis that interstate ban.king activity in
local markets enhances competitive pressures leading to lower rates on loans
and related activities to ban.king consumers. The remainder of the paper is
organized as follows. A related literah1re section is followed by a description
of the sam ple selection process, data definition and empirical setting.
Estimation results are then reported and a re followed by the conclusion.
'outhern Business Reuiew
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RELATED LITERATURE
Studies by de Cossio, Trifts, a nd Scanlon (1987), Born, Eisenbeis, and
Harris (1988), Adkisson and Fraser (1990), Black, Fields, and Schweitzer
(1990), Chong (1991), and Laderman and Pozdena (1991) have examined the
possible effect(s) of interstate banking activities on the behavior of banking
firms in the capital market. Papers by Goldberg and Hanweck (1988), Liang
and Rhoades (1988), and Berger and Humphrey (1991) have focused on the
risk-reducing effects of geographical diversification as well as economies of
scale and scope advantages in interstate banking.
A number of other studies have focused on the impact of competitive and
regulatory envi ronments on outcomes for depository institutions. Davis and
Verbm gge (1978), Rhoades and Rutz (1982), Gilbert (1984), Smirlock (1985),
Evanoff and Fortier (1988), Berger and Hannan (1989), and Rose and Wolken
(1990) provide some of the key research initiatives relating to market
stmcture, conduct, and overall performance in the depository industry.
The above studies, while providing important evidence on the impact of
interstate banking on the banking industry and the banking fi.rm, do not
provide evidence on its impact on the banking consumer. Thus, these studies
do not, in general, shed light on the impact of interstate banking on
consumers. In fact, very few studies have examined the issue of the impact of
interstate banking on the banking consumer. Moreover, the studies that have
indeed examined this issue are dated and provide inconclusive evidence.
Longbrake and Peterson (1979), using firm level data, find significant
regional differences in mortgage loan yields; however , the market stmcture
proxy variables are not found to be important in explaining regional mor tgage
rate differ entials. They conclude that initiatives to improve bank
performance through branching laws and regulatory stmcture may not
reduce the inter-regional variation of mortgage rates. In contrast, Marlow
(1982) provides evidence of lower mor tgage rates in markets with lower
deposits and firm concentration, i.e., competitive markets.
A weakness of the earlier research, as it relates to the current debate of
the effect(s} of geographical deregulation. is that the data cover the time
periods prior to the mid 1980 occurrence of regional and national reciprocal
banking developments. A subsequent increase in consolidation of depository
institutions and a greater involvement oflarge, out-of-state banks in di1Tereot
markets across the country warrants a new initiative for more studies on this
topic. These studies would be of interest to legislative and regulatory policy
makers, bank and real estate r esearchers as well as to banking consumers.'
This study re-evaluates and extends some of the issues discussed in Marlow
0982), Longbrake and Peterson (1979), and Aspinwall (1970l. Using a post
interstate banking deregulation sample period , the study provides a more
comprehensive analysis by focusing on the impact of deregulation on mortgage
rates at both the firm and market levels. More importantly, this study provides
direct evidence on the impact of geographical deregulation by introducing a
direct measure of the extent of interstate banking in the local market.
26
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SAMPLE SELECTION, EMPIRICAL SETTINGS
AND DATA DEFINITION

Sample Selection
The sample is selected from markets that experienced a reasonably
uniform development 10 interstate banking activities during the 1985-198
period. It covers depository markets and the FSLIC-insured thrifts in seven
southeastern st.ates (Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Car olina,
South Carolina.and Virginia) and those in Washington, D.C., I.hat reported to
the Fourth District of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board in 1988.
Several factors make thrifts in the southeastern region a good sample for
this study: ( 1) the region has had a relatively stable economy (Fritz. 19 9l;
(2) it is part of a single regional banking compact; and (3) it contains a rich
variety of depository organizations and mar kets. The recent development of
interstate banking legislation in the southeastern region is of particular
importance. All of the sample states joined the southeast banking compact
during the mid-1980s. In the southeast banking compact, eleven states and
the District of Columbia allow bank holding companies and thrifts from other
states in the region to acquire banks and thrifts as long as the home state of
the acquinng organization has passed a law granting reciprocal authority.'
This relatively uniform experience of regulatory developments on interstate
banking activities is extremely important in evaluating issues addressed in
this paper. :vlost of the market level data are taken from the survey of all
qualifying loans for 1-4 single-family, nonfarm, conventional mortgages closed
dunng the first five working days of each month dunng the sample year.
Respondents include commercial banks, saving banks. saving and loan
associations, and mortgage bankers in the local market The authors' focus
is on the MSA markets because the mortgage survey information is lunited to
these areas becau e almost all out-of-state banking activities, to date. have
been limited to major metropolitan stati ucal area . Tlus survey consists of
annual averages of7,877 r eported loans in 60 M A markets.'
Related firm and certain market specific data were obtained from the
"Thnft Financial Reports" submitted to the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
<FHLBB l, Summary of Saving Accounts by Geographic Area, and Data Book:
Operating Banks and Branches. Finally. market vanables represenung the
regional economy and activities were taken from a variety of sou rces such a
the C. . Department of Commerce and the Bureau of the Censm,.
Va riable Description
Heggestad (1979) points out that no rigorous theoretical model exists that
can be used as a guide 111 choosing the explanarory ,·ariables to be u ed in the
estimation. As a result, the author s' choice of variables is based on previous
empirical research.- In the market regression . the effective annual rate,
EAR, is used as the dependent variable. It is calculated by the FHLBB's
Southl'rn Business R<'utew
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amortizing initial fees and charges over a ten-year period. LP and TERM
represent loan-to-price and term-to-maturity respectively. These variables
were taken from the survey representing the type and quality of the loans. LP
is expected to have a positive impact on EAR, whereas TERM could have
either positive or negative impact.'
Population changes (POP) and housing activities (HOU\ a re used to
represent regional business activities whose movements may also reveal
potential risk associated with business lending in the market. POP is
calculated by taking the percentage changes during the 1985-1988 period.
HOU is measured by dividing the total dollar value of housing permits issued
in the local market during 1988 with the total population of the market in the
same year. Total deposits (TDEP) in the region are used as a proxy for market
size. To the extent that TDEP captures the ability of firms to attract deposits
through changing interest rates, it is expected to have a negative impact on
EAR.
The remaining variables represent the market structure. Out-of-state
institutions' deposit share (OSDEP ) represents the extent of interstate
banking activities in the market. A higher representation could signal a
highly competitive market producing lower rates for the consumers. One
may, however, argue that the entry of large out-of-state institutions would
lead to a higher deposit concentration creating a somewhat monopolistic
market resulting in higher rates. Thus, the effect is an empirical issue. The
number of firms (NFRM) and offices (NOFF) are used as proxies for the
competitive aspect of the market. In the estimation of the regressions, these
variables are entered in logarithmic form to control the possible high
correlation with regional variables, as well as the out-of-state deposit share
variable. The three firm concentration ratio (CON) represents the deposit
share of the top three depository institutions in the market. The calculation
of the latter three variables as well as the market size variable, TDEP, is
based on both the banks and thrift institutions in the local market.
Several flITll-specific variables are included to represent individual firm
characteristics. Total assets <TASS ) and capital-asset ratio (CA S l a re used to
control for economies of scale and the impact of capital in the pricing decision,
respectively. The level of mortgage loans to total assets ratio (MASSl
represents the extent of flITll specialization in mortgage lending. Delinquency
ratio (DLNS), defined as the average delinquent loans over total assets during
the 1985-1988 period, is included to test whether past loan losses affect
pricing behavior. Finally, the dependent variable fo r the firm level
regressions is the mortgage yield (MYLD l. It is defined as the ratio of
mortgage interest and fees to average mortgage loans.
Descriptive statistics of these variables ar e dis played in Table 1. On
average, the out-of-state institutions hold 13.62 percent of the total deposits
in the sample MSA markets. As the data selection criteria only included
institutions whose activities are limited to the market, the 187 firm sample
consists mainly of small- and medium-level thrift institutions of the region.
The average asset size of these th.rifts was $173 million.
28
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TABLE 1
DESCRIPTIVE SAMPLE STATISTICS
VARIABLES AND RATIOS

MKT. LEVEL DATA

Effective Annual Rate (EAR)

10.66

3.04

Loan to Price Rat10 (LP)

77.09

4 .16

Term to Maturity (TERM)

27.50

2.02

Population Change (POP )

5.86

STD. DEV

MEAN
Mortgage Yield (MYLO )

FIBM LEVEL DATA
STD. DEV

MEAN
8.85

1.37

4.86

5.73

4.0.5

572.1

545.3

652.1

387.4

6583

10.140

19.406

14,345

Dollar amount of per-capita
of Housmg (HOU )
Total Market Deposits
in millions <TDEPl
Out of States Inst1tut10ns'
Deposit Share (OSDEP)

13.62

15.06

19.15

16.30

Log of Number of Depository
Institutions ( FRM )

3.15

0.758

4.11

0.847

Log of Number of Offices (NOFF)

4.79

0.997

5.98

1.05

49.78

11.96

3 Firm Concentration
40.98

12.09

T otal Assets m millions (TASS)

173. l

279.6

Mortgage to Assets Ratio (MASS)

77.85

Gaap-Cap1tal to Assets Ratio (CASS)

5.45

10.15
6.01

Ratio (CO )

Delinquent Loan to Assets
2.07

Ratio (DLNS>
o. of Observations

60

2.84
187

Empirical Settings

The variables defined above are used in two set of multiple regressions.
In market regressions, the author s focus on determining the key
determinants of variability in effective interest rate r eported in the mor tgage
survey. Estimating f1rm level regressions, the authors concentrate on the
factors determining the yield on mortgages of thrift institutions in the sample
market. Following are the formats of the regressions.
Market Level Regr ession:
EAR

=
+

u 0 + u , LP+ CX-z TERM + a,POP + a,HOU + u.TDEP
u,;OSDEP + ct,NFRM + a. OFF+ a.CON.

SouthPrn /Juswess Reuirw
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Firm Level Regression :

MYLD = Clo+ a , TASS + a , CASS+ a 3MASS + u,DLNS +a,.POP
+ a .HOU + a .TDEP + a OSDEP + c1..NFRM
+ a:0 NOFF + 'a 11CON. •

(2)

In both sets of regressions, several of the market variables were highly
correlated among themselves and also, in some cases. v-'ith the out-of-state
deposit share variable. As the out-of-state deposit share variable is the
authors' primary focus, regressions ar e estimated by keeping this variable in
each regression and alter natively consider other market variables."
In the firm level regressions, only those institutions whose activities are
limited to local markets were included. By imposing this restriction, market
variables can be related to interest ear nings on mortgages in only one market,
even in situations in which the finn has more than one distribution point for
financial products and services. Moreover . m order to eliminate the de novo
institutions from the sample, only those institutions that are actively in
business and reported regularly to the FHLBB during the 1985-1988 period
were considered.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The market- and firm-specific regression estimates are shown in Tables 2
and 3, respectively. Each ta ble consists of several regressions co ntaining
alternative market variables in order to avoid multicolli neari ty problems. A
number of other regressions, including alter native regional variable (such as
unemployment rate) or \vithout the natural logarithm of the number of firm
and office variables, were also estima ted. These regression s did not change
the overall r esults portrayed in the text and, ther efor e, ar e not reported
separately.
All market regressions possess an F-statistlc tha t is significant at least at
the .05 level. TERM has a significant negative effect on EAR in all of the
estimated regressions. This variable was not significant in Marlow's
regression. However, it was suggested that a longer term may lead to lower
monthly payments and, consequently. to a lower probability of default.
Therefore, term-to-maturity has r esulted in a negative sign. Not surprisingly,
the coefficient of POP is positive. This indicates that , ceteris paribus, as the
rate of growth of the population increases. EAR increases. The sign of the
coefficient of TDEP is negative and marginally significant. FRM also
produces similar evidence. Such results tend to suggest tha t the larger
markets a re associated with more competition leading to lower rates. The
three firm concentration variable, CON, has a positive and significant impact,
thus suggesting a higher EAR in non-competitive markets.

30
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TABLE 2
ORDINARY LEAST SQUARE REGRESSION RESULTS
OF MARKET LEVEL DATA
(DEPENDENT VARIABLE: EFFECTIVE INTEREST RATE)
INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES

EQUATIO S WITH COEFFICIENTS & 't' STATISTICS
2

3

4

Intercept

8.62
(8.35)~

9. 15
(8.08)*

8.89
(8.51)"'

10.00
(9.38) ·

Loans-to-Price Ratio (LP )

0.005
(0.012)

0.011
(0.926)

0.008
(0.626)

0.014
(1.20)

Term to Maturity (TERM )

-0.071
(2.05 )+

-0.078
(1.99)+

-0.081
(2.25 )+

-0.93
(2.86)+

Population Change
1985-1988 <POP)

0.03 1
(2.16)+

0.040
(2.01)+

0.037
( 1.98)+

0.023
(l.89)++

Per Capita Housing
Start <HOU )

0.0001
( 1.62)

0.0001
(1.54)

( 1.17)

0.0002
(0.99)

Total Market Deposit
(TDEP)

-3.lE-8
( 1.82)++

-2.9E-9
( 1.76)++

-2.9E-9
( 1.88)++

4.5E-9
(l.78)++

Out of State I nst1tut1ons
Deposit Share (OSDEP >

-0.003
(2.01)+

-0.007
(l.99 )+

-0.006
(2. 14)+

-0.004
(l.96)+

0.00003

-0.327
( 1.90 )++

Log of Number of Depository
Inst1tut10ns (NFRM l

-0.212
(0.730)

Log of Number of Depository
Offices ! NOFFl

0.007
(2.01)+

3 Firm Concentration
Ratio (CO l

MODEL ESTIMATES
AdJ. R Square
F Statistics
Number of Observations
Note: 't' statistics in parenthesis

Southern B us,nes~ Heuiew

0.274
3.05+

3.65

0.352

0.314

2.59+

3.11+

4.20'

60
•, +, ++ are significant at 1'1-. 5r;. and 10·, levels respecuvely
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TABLE 3
ORDINARY LEAST SQUARE REGRESSION RESULTS
OF FIRM LEVEL DATA
(DEPENDENT VARIABLE: YI ELD ON MORTGAGES)
VARIABLES

EQUATIO 'S WITH COEFFICIENTS & 't' STATISTICS
1
2
3
4

Intercept

7.22
(6.84 )~

7.62
(6.88)•

7.46
(6.38)"

7.28
(6.42)*

Total Assets (TASS)

-.000001
(3.22)'

-.000001
(3. 14)·

-.000001
(3.44) ·

-.000001
(3.36)•

Mor tgage to Assets
Ratio (MASS)

2.17
(4.34 )"

2.36
(4.28) ·

2.26
(4.06 )'

2.16
(4. 18)•

Gaap-Cap1tal to
Assets Ratio (CASS)

0.142
( 1.90)++

0.173
( 1.96)+

0.105
(2.02)+

0.113
(2.05)+

Delinquent Loans to
Assets Ratio (DLNS)

0.052
(l.73 )++

0.043
< 1.78)++

0.048
( 1.90)++

0.050
(1.88)++

Population
Change (POP)

0.001
( 1.85)++

0.004
( 1.72)++

0.003
(1.60)

0.004
(l.61)

Per Capita Housing
Start (HOU )

0.0003
( 1.60)

0.0001
( 1.56)

0.0003
( 1.62)

0.0003
(1.54)

Total Market
Deposit (TDEP)

3.6E-9
( 1.20)

4.SE-9
(1.38)

3.6E-9
<1.20)

2.8E-9
(1.36)

Out of State Inst1tut1ons'
Deposit Share <OSDEP}

-0.004
(2.32)+

-0.006
(2.1.5)+

-0.003
(2.02 )+

-0.007
(2. 10)+

Log of Number of Depository
Institutions (NFRM )

-0.020

<1.30)

Log of Number of
Depository Offices (NOFF)

0.020
( 1.93 )++

0.016

3 Firm Concentration
Ratio (CON )

(2.09)+

MODEL ESTIMATES
AdJ. R Squared
F Statistics
Number of Observations
Note 't' statistics
32

10

0. 142
4.82'

0. 152
5.01'""

0. 154
4.99'

0.159
4.68'

187
parenthesis. ', +. ++are s1gruficant at 1r,. 5o/c-, and 10% levels respectively.
Southern Business Reuiew

Io both the market and the fmn level regressions, OSDEP has the
expected sign and is significant at least at the .05 level in all reported
regressions in both tables. These results are consistent with the hypothesis
that the interest rate in the market is inversely affected by the increasing
presence of out-of-state institutions in the market. Io firm-specific
r egressions, TASS has a negative and statistically significant impact in all
regressions. However, the extremely small value of the coefficient (.0001)
prevents a conclusion of any significant economic impact of asset size on
mortgage return. Specialization in mortgage lending, proxied by MTASS. is
positively associated with a higher yield.
The coefficient on CA S is positive and significant, thus suggesting that
highly capitalized institutions are more successful in the product market. The
variable DL S also has a positive sign; however, it is only marginally
significant. The positive and significant coefficient on NOFF suggests that
the distributional intensity is an important variable in explaining the return
on loans in the sample markets. This result is consistent with the findings by
Hasan and Smith (1992) for a sample that includes both metropolitan and
rural markets. Similar to the results obtained in the market regressions, the
variable COK has the expected sign and is significant at conventional
confidence levels. Finally, the variables POP and TDEP are not significant at
conventional significance levels.'
In summary, the results indicate that at both the firm and industry level,
an inver e relationship between mortgage yields and the level of interstate
banking exists. These results provide trong upport for the hypothesis that
geographical deregulation is beneficial to the banking consumer,,
CO CLU IONS

Overall, the results portray a competitive environment in the post
geographically deregulated environment. The result are reasonably trong
in suggesting that interstate banking presence has lead to a competitive
market and lower mortgage rates. It is difficult to capture the true
competitive pres!:iure in a local market. The attempt to use a deposit-based
measure is the be&t available information on financial sernce activitie for the
ample period Inclusion of mortgage banks and finance companie:, 111 the
sample would have further strengthened uch an analyst . The present trend
of geographical deregulation is a healthy one for the indm,try and it
customer::. It seems that the removal of inter:,tate barrier» mduce more
competition and reduces monopoly rent capability of depository institutions in
the previou ly protected markets. Clearly. the impact of regulatory
developments on product pricing and cost de erves furtJ1er investigation.

Southern IJu.\tne.,s R,•uww
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ENDNOTES
'See Amel (1988) and Congress Report (19911 for details on the laws and
regulatory developments on geographical deregulations in the U.S. banking
system.
•Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation <FSLIC) is currently
known as Saving Associations Insura nce Fund (SAIF ) under the umbrella
insurance organization of depository institutions, Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC). Federal Home Loan Bank Board is currently known as
Office of the Thrift supervision !OT ).
3
An additional advantage of using thrifts from this region in this study is
that since the 1982 recession, U1e outheaster n economy has not been
su bjected to the extreme economic cycles that have characterized many other
regions of the nation. These economic cycles have been accompanied by
corresponding cycles in earnings a nd expenses of banks and thrifts in such
regions as the outhwest and the 1 ortheast.

'For more details on intersta te banking development in the outheast see
Hasan (1989).
'·At the firm level analyses. the investigation is limited to thrift
institutions because firm specific data are not publicly available for a sizable
number of mortgage banks or fina nce companies.
';tJ'he wn.mary of Savings Account and Data Book is published by OT
and FDIC respectively.
'It should be noted tha t previous studies that have add ressed this issue
also suffer from this weakness.

• For a detailed discussion on the expected signs of the term-to-maturity
on interest ra tes see Barth, Cordes. a nd Yezer (1979 ) a nd Ma rlow (19 2l.
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'Correlation Coefficient of the Highly Correlated and Statistically
Significant Market Variables
TOFF

co

Variables

OSDEP

NFRM

OSDEP

1.00

0.35

0.41

0.39

1.00

0.52

0.46

1.00

0.44

FIRM
NOFF
CON
Note:

1.00

All other market and firm speci fic vanables reported a s tatistically ms1gmficant or low
correlation coefficient and therefore are not reported here.

''These regression estimates are available upon r equest.
"Given the ad hoc nature of the regression model, the authors have used
a number of specification tests for significant "bias." One of the tests used is
called RESET (regr ession specification errors test). In its simplest form, the
procedure involves running a "test r egression" that includes the square of the
predicted value of the dependent variable as a regressor. If the coefficient of
the squared value in the test regression is not "significant." the null
hypothesis of no-specification-error can be maintained. In this case. the test
was conducted fo r all sets of regressions in both models. The t-statistics
associated with the squared dependent variable were not statistically
significant at any meaningful level. See Ramsey (1969) and Ramsey and
Schmidt (1976) for the explanation of the econometric logic underlying these
tests. The authors also have used White's (1980) :,pecification test. The tstatistics reported in Tables 2 and 3 used White's heteroscedasticity-corrected
covariance matrix whenever the White test rej ects the specification at the 5r<
level. Except for the "HOU" variable, the White specification test could not
reject the specification at 5 percent level in all cases
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